Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss.

Argument: It is axiomatic that due process principles restrict criminal liability to violations of laws of which the accused has fair notice. Criminal liability may not attach to conduct that is beyond the scope of an unambiguous criminal proscription— and all close calls must be resolved in favor of the defendant. Where a criminal violation is not supported by clear, existing authority—or where it is even a close question—the reviewing court should dismiss the criminal indictment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B)(v). Doing so ensures fairness by avoiding the grave harms associated with criminal prosecution—which frequently cannot be remedied by eventual reversal on appeal—while preserving the Department’s ability to pursue the prosecution if a reviewing court sees the law differently. These principles strongly support dismissal of the indictment here. Existing authority does not support criminal liability on the basis of a no-solicitation agreement, which no court has ever held to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Allowing the prosecution to proceed in these circumstances would be inconsistent with existing law and the Department’s own policy statements—and would thus violate due process. 

Brief of Amici Curiae the Cato Institute, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Americans for Prosperity Foundation, and Due Process Institute in Support of Petitioner-Appellant.

Argument: The Supreme Court has consistently rejected attempts to apply the federal criminal property fraud statutes beyond their clearly intended and expressed scope. Applying the federal criminal property fraud statutes to breaches of contractual provisions like the DBE requirement would violate the fundamental principles regarding notice, federalism, and avoiding overcriminalization that motivate the Supreme Court’s decisions.

Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners.

Argument: The dramatic impact that Marsy’s Law would have on Pennsylvania’s criminal justice system is not mere speculation. Other states have adopted nearly identically vague and broad constitutional amendments, which have resulted in substantial harm not only to criminal defendants, but also to the administration of the criminal justice system. This amicus brief summarizes the substantial burdens that Marsy’s Law has imposed in other states where it has gone into effect. The right “to reasonable and timely notice of and to be present at all public proceedings involving the criminal or delinquent conduct” has cost counties and states millions of dollars and congested court dockets. Marsy’s Law states have struggled to deal with the financial impact of the notice provision. The docket congestion caused by the notice provision has caused intolerable delays in proceedings. The right “to reasonable protection from the accused or any person acting on behalf of the accused” has led to absurd results in pretrial release decisions. The right to “full and timely restitution” will take money from the courts. The codification of “respect for the victim’s…privacy” and the right “to reasonable protection from the accused” has made it more difficult for law enforcement to solve crimes and left the public lacking critical information about criminal activity.

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan, and National Association for Public Defender as Amici Curiae Supporting Affirmance.

Argument: Due process bars the state from prosecuting a person for otherwise-innocent conduct—including convicted persons' failure to register their presence with law enforcement—without proof of wrongful intent. SORA criminalizes conduct that is ordinarily innocent, and even law enforcement officials disagree on what otherwise-innocent conduct SORA makes criminal. Notice provisions do not replace the due process requirement of proving wrongful intent. Prosecutorial discretion adds to SORA's due process problems.

Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, Center for Democracy & Technology, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and Scholars in Support of Defendant-Appellant Gilberto Valle.

Argument: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) does not prohibit violations of computer use restrictions. The CFAA was meant to target “hacking,” not violations of computer use restrictions. This case presents a mere use restriction. The District Court’s broad reading of the CFAA renders it unconstitutionally vague. Corporate policies do not provide sufficient notice of what conduct is prohibited. Allowing CFAA liability for mere use restrictions turns a vast number of ordinary individuals into criminals.

Amici Curiae Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Ninth Circuit Federal Public and Community Defenders in Support of Appellant's Petition for Rehearing En Banc.

Argument: Congress lacks the power to prohibit crime against a building because its occupants engage in activities that affect interstate commerce. The Jones Court deliberately construed § 844(i) to avoid the pitfall identified by Morrison and Lopez. The panel erred by asking the question eschewed by Jones, thereby extending § 844(i) ‘s reach unconstitutionally.

Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and Center for Democracy & Technology in Support of Appellant.

Argument: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act does not prohibit violations of computer use restrictions, such as the restriction at issue. The CFAA was meant to target "hacking," not violations of computer use restrictions. Written, policy-based restrictions on manner of access are restrictions on use. The lower court's broad reading of the CFAA renders the statute unconstitutionally vague. Corporate policies do not provide sufficient notice of what conduct is prohibited. Basing CFAA liability on violations of use restrictions would permit capricious enforcement by prosecutors. This Court should reverse Appellant's conviction under Specification 13 of Charge II.